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1. Preface 
Recently, "Japanese management" has aroused peoples' interest 
in Japan and abroad, becase it is considered to be the secret of the 
good performance of Japanese economy resulting in high productivi-
ty and strong international competitive power of Japanese companies. 
Certainly, Japanese capitalism, which rapidly revived from the in-
dustrial collapse incurred by World War Il, successfully bridged 
over the worldwide structure changes of capitalism by overcoming 
dallercrisis, twice-hit oil crises, and the consequeut serious economic 
recession of these days. 
I2Y 
Japanse major companies still maintain their high earning power ;t-: 
and keen competive power which is threatening the United States 
and Eurpean Community industries. This argument is, however, 
rather superficial in a sense that it doesn't come at another aspect 
.of Japanese economy, '1979 Employment Status Survey, shows that 
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among the population of 883 million of fifteen years old and over. 
and 4. 76 million workers wish to change their job, 2. 94 million 
workers wishing to have additional job, and 2. 57 million persons 
unemployed wishing to work-10, 270,000 (11. 6%) altogether and 
4, 320,000 of them (4. 9%) looking for employment. Those statistics 
indicate that the official announcement of 1. 20 million unemployed 
people (2%) is far from the realities. Furthermore "cheap manage-
ment" and "rationalization" has intensified labor and working condi-
tions. The Japan Federation of Employers Association has recently 
informed that the total working hours are 200 hours more than 
those of the U. S, 400 hours more than that of those West Ger-
many. Vacations with pay, which are much fewer than in other 
advanced industrialized countries, are spent only 30 to 40 percent 
and "over time without pay" is getting more common. Wages of 
Japanese laborers, which are exceedingly low from the international 
standard, have shown a marked tendency to be kept in a lower 
level since 1975, and the real wages have been greatly reduced. 
Nevertheless, there seems no strong action to stand against this trend 
among the Japanese worker, especially of major companies. The 
number of the members of labor unions has been decreasing since 
1975, so has been the number of labor disputes both in private and 
in public sectors. Absentism, which was often seen in the industri-
ally advanced countries in the 70's, did not influence Japanese 
workers at all. Amazingly, Japanese companies are still proud of 
more than 95 per cent of attendance of their employees. 
Why is the Japanese worker is so industrous in such miserable 
labor conditions? Forced long and hard labor, with cheap wages, 
ll!l 
1i without taking enough vacations, why do they go to work day after 
day ? Why won't they go on strike but cooperate with companies, 
standing out for higher productivity ? Here it seems very signifi-
cant to review at the "Japanese management". I will discuss indu-
strial relations as well as overall enterprise states, with which 
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Japanese economy has been supported and expanded. 
2. Industrial Society of Japanese Style 
Japanese capitalism is highly developped and the socialization 
of production has so much advanced that the big businesses now 
can rule strongly the systems of both production snd distribution 
and exercise great power for the maintenance of Japanese economic 
society. This sort of big businesses which have been entrenched 
here is, however, is not a Japanese peculiar phenomenon but a general 
tendency recent capitalism all over the world. What is unique 
for Japan is that the big businesses have greatly contributed to 
Japanese capitalism, which has society an utterly business enterpri-
se-centered one and which in effect, restrains civil society. 1 will 
discuss this Japanese peculiar characteristics from three points; 1) 
The cooperation system of the government with enterprises, 2) 
Solid enterprise groups, 3) Formulization without contents of com-
pany systems. 
1) Estublishment of a cooperation system between the govern-
ment and enterprise ("Japan, Inc."). 
Japanese capitalism has traditional promoted the Government-
enterprise cooperation system, the so called "Japan, Inc.". A strong 
state policy for big business produced ZAIBATSU which built up 
prewar Japanese imperialism and the simiar policy realized postwar 
rapid economic growth of Japan. The policy itself is the basic factor 
which has pushed up Japanese economy to an "economic power". 
So I'm going to bring out how the Japanese Government with 
its own state mechanism has contributed toward the development 
ll9 
and the high accumulation of the capitals of big businesses. ll9 
[ 1] The Japanese Government has wholly ensuced large funds 
for investments in big plants and machinery through the Bank of 
Japan, some city banks, other Government-sponsored financial organs 
and treasury investments and loans of the Government. The great 
!m 
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amount of privete investments in plant and equipment caused the 
rapid economical growth of Japan and as a result, big businesses 
obtained the great prducing power with the highest levels of techno-
logy and equipment in the world. The details shall be discussed 
later, when the features of financial management of Japanese en-
terprieses are anal yzed. 
( 2 ] The Japanese Government put a large Government funds 
inorder to improvement of industrial foundations, such as location 
of industries, water for industries, energy, road and harbor facili-
ties, all for the accumulation of capital of big businesses. The 
Government named such arrangements "pudlic undertakings" and 
inserted them into the overall, and the regional development plans, 
and invested 70 per cent of the whole administrative investment in 
them. The public investments out of the general accounts were 
maintained at the high ratio of 30 per cent in Japan in the 1970's, 
while it was only 4. 9 per cent in the U.S., 10.4 per cent in West 
Germany, 4. 7 per cent in the U.K., and 3. 9 per cent in France. 
That is to say, the Government kindly used its tax revenues for 
the investments, which should have been done by enterprises them-
selves, thereby creating fovorable conditions for the high accumula-
tion of capital. Thus the living standard for the citizens have been 
left far below, while big businesses have rapidly enlarged their 
strong competitive power and great capital reserves. 
[ 3] The Japanese Government has specially protected the big 
businesses in the tax system, too. 
CD In Japan, the corporation tax rate has been kept rather low 
for the capital accumulation of enterprises. Especially in the 60's, 
when the Japanese economy was growing rapidly, the rate was only 
30 per cent in Japan, while it was 50 to 60 per cent in other deve-
loped countries. Later on, as criticised in Japan and abroad, the 
Japanese Goverment changed the rate into 49.47 per cent in 1981, 
but it is still lower internationally: 52. 06 per cent in the U .S., 52 
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per cent in the U.K., 50 per cent in France, and 56. 52 per cent in 
West Germany. 
® The Special Clauses of Tax Laws Acts take favorable action 
for big businesses. The system was built up in 1951 in order to 
promote the rationalized investment industries. Since then, more 
than 150 kinds of actions for enterprises were taken: e. g. special 
finances for renewal of antiquated plants and machinery, special 
actions for overhauling the system of enterprises, also for promot-
ing the unity of companies to strengthen their competitive power, 
etc. The reduction taxes by the Special Clauses of Tax Laws Acts 
was officially announced as about 800 billion yen in 1975, and it is 
said to be five or six times more in reality. 
@ The bigger an enterprise, the lower tax rates is subject to 
big businesses can change their profits into expenses legally such 
as reserves for price fluctuations, reserves for possible loan losses, 
reserves for retirement allowances, etc., so they can be taxed very 
lightly. In 197 4, the corporation tax rate was 30. 2% for big busi-
nesses capitalized at more than ¥ 10 million, while it was 46. 3 per 
cent for small businesses capitalized at ¥ 50 million to ¥ 100 mil-
lion. 
( 1 ) In Japan, adhesion between the Goverment and business 
world is clear in the personnel combinations. The appointments of 
farmer to responsible positions in private companies ("amakudari"), 
and the governmental policy council led by magnates of business 
circles are representative examples. 
CD In Japan, every year 400 to 500 of the bureaucrats are 
moved into private companies. Forexample, some officials of the 
IZll 
Minisrry of Construction, of the Ministry of Agriculture & Foresty 
or of the Ministry of International Trade & Industry assume posts 
in private construction companies, some of the Ministry of Transpor-
tation go into private aviation companies, some of the Defence 
Agency go in weapon arms makers, from the Bank of Japan and the 
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Ministry of Finance some officials will go in private finance compa-
nies. Most outstanding has been an "amakudari business" of Nis-
shoiwai, a general trading company, which· was scandalized because 
they had succeeded in obtaining a big military plane businss through 
the good offices of a former official of the Defence Agency now on 
their staff, and the scandal to light the adhesions of enterprises to 
the Governmeet. 
® Special councils and the boards of inqury of the Government 
influence greatly over policy planning desicions, and admistrative 
affaires of the Government. The major eleven of special councils 
are cosist of 373 councillors of which 56 per cent is leading mag-
nates in business circles and 20 per cent is the Government offi-
cials. Especially those big business executives of the Federation 
of Economic Organizations are taking initiative in the Economic 
Policy Council, which is an advisory organ for the Prime Minister, 
and in the Industry Construction Council, which has much to do 
with economic planning and operation, also in the Finance Council, 
and in the Foreign Economic Cooperation Council. 
Some outstanding examples of the Government-enterprises co-
operation system are found in the Government long-range economic 
plans by the Ministry of International Trade & Industry and the 
Economic Planning Agency also in the general economic develop-
ment plan, which is connected with the long-ranged management 
plans and the management strategy of the big businesses. 
@ Many Prime Ministers, simce 1945, made their own social 
groups with the magnates of business circles: They are SATO Ca-
binet-CHOEIKAI, IKEDA Cabinet-KOCHIKAI, OHIRA Cabinet-
Im 
SHUNKOKAI, SUZUKI Cabinet-SEIREIKAI. 
Even though the whole system of the corporate state has not 
been exposed yet here, one may see how the great "Japan Inc." is 
constructed in the Japanese capitalism. The "Japanese management" 
is based on the big business state. 
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( 2) Enterprise Groups and Management Control 
When the ZAIBATSU offices were compelled their dissolution 
and such ZAIBATSU families, such as the Mitsui,the Iwasaki, and 
the Yasuda were purged, Japanese big businesses found new ways 
for the mobilization of more capitals, for the accumulation of more 
production and more caital, and for more monopolization. The 
ZAIBATSU, which were dissolved once, have been restored and 
grew to be the six greatest enterprise groups of the Mitsubishi, 
the Mitsui, the Sumitomo, the Fuji, the Daiich-Kangyo-bank, the 
Sanwa and they now keep inestimable power on the whole economy 
of Japan. 
The prewar ZAIBA TSU contraized and closed itself and affilia-
ted lots of enterprises, but the postwar enterprise groups are based 
on mutual share holding and strengthen the unity by dispatching 
corporate officers, by financing to the member enterprises by doing 
business with the members, by engaging in new business through 
joint efforts, by supervising the common trademark, etc,. 
Instead of the prewar ZAIBATSU head offices, the enterprise 
groups built up president meetings for strategic decision making 
under the group leadership. Each president meeting is named as 
· follows. The Mitsubishi group of 28 companies-KINYOKAI, the 
MITSUI group of 23 companies-NIKIKAI, the SUMITOMO group 
of 21 companies-HAKUSUIKAI, the Fuji group of 29 companies-
FUYOKAI, the DAIICHIKANGIN group of 45 companies-SANKIN-
KAI, the SANW A grnup of 39 companies-SANSUIKAI. 
While the prewar great four ZAIBATSU, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo, and Yasuda, were holding 544 companies directry or in-
12ll 
directry and their total capital was 24. 5 per cent of the whole in- 0 
dustries, today the financial capital of the six great enterprise 
groups holds 8,476 companies, 30. 9 per cent of the whole industries 
in capital and those enterprise groups are forming the corporate 
state with the Government enterprises cooperation system. 
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The management on the top of the big business state has deve-
loped with Japanese capitalism and is now highly .systematized. 
The executives of the big businesses are said to have become 
the controllers of enterprises, taking the place of the prewar pri-
vately-owned capital owners. Although the ZAIBATSU were dis-
solved mutual confedence among the companies within the system 
has been great party because they share their stocks one another. 
This mutual confidence is brought about by the management con-
sisting of the managers who are concurrently capital owners of the 
company to assure the management control. By the way, the Ja-
panese managemant of a big enterprise has, so to say, a special 
kind of hierachy of a beaurocratic organization. During the time 
employees are promoted by senioriiy order and by academic career 
order, they are made to be the able managers who serve for their 
own enterprises, and those managers are to hold much more stocks 
than other staff and general stockholders. In short, the higher one 
moves up in the corporate laddor, the more stocks one is to own. 
Certainly, the stocks held by those executives show only a small 
percentage of the whole issued stocks of an enterprise, and those 
executives who are included in the ten largest stockholders of the 
enterprise concerned are rather exceptional. The stock ownership 
of execuives is, however, worth paying attention to, because it plays 
a very important role in the company in the mutual-stock-holding 
system within the same enterprise group. 
In shortly, the executives of Japanese big businesses were young 
empl'oyees once, then distinguished themselves to the management 
by gradually rising the corporate and their leadership abilities 
:fL tested as managers, then got the positions of executives and owned 
treasure stocks of the enterprise. That's to say, they changed from 
labor into capitalists as they rose. And those executives or con-
temporary capitalists have gained, very strong and tight control 
over the management!. 
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( 3 ) Campany System, Japanese Style 
The executives' control over the management will be discuss-
ed here in reference to the company systems of big businesses. 
It is well known that the general meeting of shareholders, the bo-
ard of directors, and the committee of auditors were built up hi-
storically and principally as the systems for running companies 
democratically. There is a tendency today, however, to deny cor-
porate democracy in every capitalistic state. Especially in Japan 
the directorial control by the board of directors has been fixed in 
the company system over a long period of time, and the closed 
characteristics of enterprises has strengthened this tendency. 
In the Japanese management system of a big business, the 
board of directors consists of the top management; JOMUKAI 
(senior executives) and the president of the company, and it has 
a SOMUBU (Allgemeinediensteabtailung) as its general staff, and 
the top management exercises strong authority to plan, to do, to see 
all the personnel affairs, labor management relations, financing, 
etc. 
On the contrary, generally speaking, the general meetinng of 
stock holders which should be in a position of the top decision-
making organ has never been given enough power and has comple-
tely failed to function. The genral shareholders are not guaranteed 
their profit, either. 
The SOMUBU offen use "SOKAIYA" (meeting flies) to finish 
general meetings of shareholders in 20 to 30 minutes. According to 
the survey conducted by the Metropolitan Police Board, there are 
about 7, 000 of SOKAIYA in Tokyo and Osaka and it is said that a 
big wig runs the whole things and that some politicians have some- i\ 
thing to do with them. In spite of the amendments of Commercial 
Law which have regulated the businesses, such SOKAIY A are still 
1. Fujii, Mitsuo, KEIEISHI-NIHON (Business History of Japan) Tokyo: 
Nihon Hyoron, 1982, p. 332. 
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paid hundreds of millions of yen per year as "the membership fee" 
from "company entertainment budgets". Furthermore, a few of well 
known cases are noted: JAPAN AIR LINE Co., Ltd. (JAL) and 
Tokyo Gas Co., Ltd., in which SOKAIYA succeeded in taking hands 
even in some factional strives at the top management level. 
The system for auditing those irregular management and ac-
counting doesn't work well, in the Japanese enterprises because the 
executives themselves, who have arisen through the seniority order, 
will gained the positions of auditors just before they reach the 
mandatory retirement. So it is impossible to expect them to check 
the performance of the top management. Also certified public ac-
countants as the external auditors are, unlike in the U.S, or other 
countries, usually employed by the president of the company. If 
an auditor, against the will of the top management, disclosed any 
problems of the accounting before the public, he would never be 
entrusted by the president. There can be no justice in audintig when 
the inspector is employed by the inspected. According to the basic 
principle that "self auditing is not auditing," the auditings of Ja-
panese big busisess enterprises are not real auditings. 
As long as the CP As depend upon enterprises, how the enter-
prises are run cannot be fully disclosed so that the enterprises can 
take antisocial actions. 
As it has been discussed, besides the directorial control by the 
boards of directors, the executives are producing a closed society 
in the Japanese big businesses with their capital ownership. This 
dual structure of'the management control should be stressed. And 
_ such control by the executives is possible when they are vigorously 
-1::: supported by the conciliative leaders of corporate union. 
The labor-management relations in enterprises are discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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3. Industial Relations of Japanese Style 
"The Three Sacred Treasures" of the Japanese management are 
said to be life-time employment, seniority wages, and corporate 
unions. Here, at first, each of them will be discussed briefly. 
( 1) Life-time Employment System 
If the life-time employment system is defined, as general, the 
system in which all new college graduate employees continue work-
ing in the same company until their retirement, there has never 
existed such system in Japanese enterprises. Compared with the 
prewar working conditions, in which employees were easily laid 
off, postwar management met the resistance of the labor union and 
couldn't dischage workers door so easily, therefore management 
tended to lengthen the terms of employment. It is worth mention-
ing though, that in fact, lots of young, midlle and old workers in 
varied age brackets resigned their jobs and only the employees 
considered indispensable by the management were committed to the 
long-term employment. 
The "cheap management" carried out in the late 1970's, didn't 
give up the long-term employment system, but reduced marginal 
employees. As a result, it deceased the total number of workers 
and increased the percentage of the number of the essential long-
termed employees. That's to say, in the "cheap management", big 
businesses took up the policy to run by fewer workers of superior 
ability and those selected are still provided with life-time employ-
ment. The Japanese management took advantage of the "reduction" 
to creare the favorable condition not only for the maintaining the -::::: 
life-time employment system for the selected workers, but also for r' 
meritocratic reorganization. 
For the first step, the middle and old aged workers who are 
surplus employees were discharged because of shortage of positions 
in the administration caused by the enlarged middle and old aged 
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and the policy for the selected fewer. Also it was necessary to 
rejuvenate the labor strcture to realize mobiler and more flexible 
job arrangement, also to built unattended factories. With these pur-
poses, keeping the life-time employment system formally, the ma-
nagement promoted voluntary retirement of workers and employees 
of related enterprise and introduced the optional age limit in the 
retirement system. 
Secondly, with labor-saving devices, job reorganization was put 
into operation, then labor transfer and job switches were necessary. 
This means that the workers were forced to change their offices or 
their jobs in charge and that only adaptable workers were demand-
ed and were ensured the life-time employment. 
Thirdly, so called "the peripheral labor" was made use of. In 
the reorganization of jobs and sections, peripheral jobs began to be 
entrusted to subcontractors or left to part-time workers. And a 
labor pool which accommodates workers reassingned from big busi-
nesses was necessary. It was not until the peripheral labor was 
effectively used that the selected few could maintain their life-time 
employment. Some new systems were applied to temporary employ-
ees and outside employees (SHAGAIKO), for the same purpose. 
The life-time employment system is a framewook which en-
sures a job and then a stable way of living for workers and only 
when an employee is regarded as an indispensable emplyee in an 
enterprize, he can get in the frame. If many workers want to be 
with in this framework, they should do so on competitive basis. 
Today when newly college graduate workers come into the labor 
market, they find themselves in the severe competition, and since 
'Ji educatioal background has become the decisive factor for the com-
petition, it is cear that those who have the most brilliant acade-
mic background can enter into the big businesses and get into the 
long-term employment system and those who are educationally low-
ranked have to feel uneasy without stable employment, and actual-
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ly those who are out of the framework are increasing in number. 2 
( 2) The Seniority Wages System 
This is the wage system in big businesses for the indispensa-
ble employees who benefit the life-time employment. The wages 
are raised according to the length of the workers' service and to 
the skills they thave obtained in it, and today ones' weges cannot 
be determined only with the length of his service, but depend much 
on ones' skills. The skills to fulfil his function, to understand ma-
nufacturing processes, to cooperate with his fellow workers and with 
the company are totally assessed, which means that the abilities 
are grown during the long time of service and assessed for the long 
span of time. 
In the Japanese management, at first, when a new college gra 
duate is employeed by an enterprise, their wages are set according 
to his academic career, later he is promoted and . his annua 
pay raise set in accordance with mentioned above. In this seniori~ 
ty wage system, when the worker is regarded that he has contri· 
puted to the company greatly, he wins a speedy promotion and since 
the management has limited those employees to when the life-time 
employment is applied, the competition among workers not to be 
excluded from the framework in their middle ages is getting keen. 
And the young winners in the competition to enter big businesses 
are thrown into another keen competition in each hierarchy of 
school career. So the seniority wages is a very incentive system 
concering raises in salary and high status and it has a manage-
ment function to control the workers individually and distinctivly. 
This seniority wage system has collectively maintained united labor 
as cheaply as possible for a longe time on a stable basis and has I2:Y 
effectively used the labor cultivating corporate consciousness among 
2. Motozima, Kunio, DAIKIGYO NO NAKADE YURERU KYOSOTEKI 
ZINSEI (Competive Life in large Enterprise in Japan) in KEIZAI (Econo-
mics) No.210, 1981, pp. 78-81. 
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workers and made it cooperative with the management. 
The seniority wage system has another social function: it keeps 
the wage low in its standard and its structure. In other words, 
basically in this system, the woker at the beginning of his career 
earns a salary that is commensurate with a bachelor's cost of living 
and will raise obtain a raise proportionate to an increase his living 
expenses as he marries and has a family. And even though the 
standard of the wages of Japanese workers are for higher than prewar 
standard, the real wages are in fact decreasing because of chronic 
inflation, and stay on a very low level compared with those of other 
advanced countries. The strong competitive power of Japanese go-
ods is obviously due to the lower cost of the small labor share as 
well as to the high quality of the goods and the high productivity 
of the enterprises. 
( 3) Corporate Unions 
A corporate labor's union is, as a general rule, organized by 
all the permanent employees, both of the white-collar and the blue-
collar workers of a company. Generally corporate unions have some 
weak points that they have a difficulty to take united actions in 
the same industry and to develop political movements altogether, 
and that a corporate union may exclude temporary employees and 
outside workers of the same business from the unity. .Moreover, 
a corporate union is very likely to be united with the management 
and to strengthen the corporate consciousness of the labor, which is 
defective as a labor's union. 
A workshop oranization of a union should reflect the opinions 
of the members in their activities and support the negotiations with 
the management and elect union officers, but in fact, it often 
overlap the workshop conference of foremen, which is a small unit 
of the administrative organization. The conference is held generally 
as one of the safty means, but actually it is a meeting place which 
deal with the problems and complains in the workshop, and also 
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union officers are elected here, and it's not different from the 
workshop organization of the union. Since this coference is en-
trusted with more power to solve the problems, the complaints and 
demands in the workshop are brought not to the branch of the 
union, but to the organization of the administrative office. And 
even, the positions of union branch officers are usuelly occupied 
by responsible workers, such as foremen, who lead the conference. 
The elections of the union officers are held as a part of the admi-
nistrative machinery and only faithful, responsible workers should 
be elected. Anyone who goes against it and runs for the election 
will be excluded from the "community" of the workshop and re-
pressed in public. Here the union puts a hand to the collectivism 
of enterprises, a fact that is characteristic of Japanese labor's unions 
of big businesses. 
As the result, the union, allied with the management, is super-
vised by the labor-management cooperation policy. 
It is rather common in the promotion system of the Japanese 
big businesses that a leading employee is elected a union officer 
and that an able union officer becomes a manager and then rises to 
the top management. A 1978 survey by the Japan Federation of 
Employers Association show that 235 companies or 66.8 per cent of 
352 surveyed companies had at least one executive who had been 
union officer. In number of persons, 1,012 of 6,456 executives, 
that's to say the one sixth had been once union officers. 
From the findings, the unity between the management and the 
labor is so evident that prevalent now is an ideology stressing 
corporate communities, such as "There is no capitalist in Japan". 
or "There is no class distinctions in Japan." 
The Japanese management is operating the corporate communi-
ties and holding each worker's whole personality. If only a worker 
gets out of the community he belongs to, he will not only be shunned 
by his fellow workers but also loses in competitions for his achieve-
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ments and have a hard time making his living. So superficially 
in attitude, he must accept the corporate community as a fate. 
The labor's union has possibility to be even an implement of the 
corporate fascism in Japan. 
4. Growth Financing Structure and its Reorganization 
During the high-economic-growth period, the Japanese big busi-
nesses depended on banks for their numerous facility investments. 
Since the industrial revolution in Japan, a tradition in the Japanese 
economy is that industry have been supplied by indirect financing 
of the Japan Central Bank and other city banks and that indirect 
financing took root and extended in tl:le high growth period. In 
those days, in proportion to the increas of borrowed funds, it got 
easier to build new plants and enhance the production simultaneously 
in order to reduce the cost of product and to be victorious in the 
corporate competitions, and then to realize the high accummulation 
of capital, because the inflation spiral made the repayment easy. 
The interests of the borrowed money could be counted in pecuniary 
loss, and the fund cost was lower than to issue stocks and defen-
tures. Thus, a particular financing structure, so called "borrowing 
business" was brought about. In 1974, the stock holders' equity 
ratio was 53. 2 per cent in the U.S., 30. 0 per cent in West Germany 
while it was 10. 3 per cent in Japan. In this condition, if only 
an enterprise earned enough for the interests of the borrowed money, 
it could grow quickly and it could compete with others keeping its 
returns profit low and if the sales by oligopoly prices were possible, 
the accelerated depreciation for technical innovation and the re-
venue of hage profits of income retained in the business made it 
possible to set up the financial institutions for the business itself, 
aside of the borrowed money. 
With credit creation by the Bank of Japan, it was normalized 
for city banks to advance enormous amount of funds for big busi-
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nesses with over-loan of the banks. That's to say, the inflationary 
financial policy by the Government and the Bank of Japan caused 
big businesses to over-borrow funds that the latter depended more 
on bank for funds than on their own funds. And with those indirect 
financing systems, capital funds were efficiently revolved by con-
centrating on big businesses and consequently the high accumulation 
of their capitals were realized. 
In 1976, capitalized more than ¥ 1 billion were 1, 600 big compa-
nies, which were 0. 1% of 1. 2 million of all the corporate enterprises. 
They were furnished with 50% or ¥56,000 billion of the whole sum 
of money borrowed by coporate enterprises, ¥130,000 billion, and 
91 per cent of the whole financing by the Government-sponsored 
Japan Development Bank and 94 per cent of the financing by the 
Export-Inport Bank of Japan. And those banks financed the big 
businesses in very profitable conditions with lower interests, longer 
terms and on less collateral security, than the funds for small bu-
sinesses. Furthermore, city banks that closely cooperated with big 
businesses proceeded to the systematization in their enterprise groups. 
Through the loans made available the banks also expanded their 
control over the big businesses by holding the latter's stocks and 
assigning their senior offices to the latter. 
However during the period of change from high-growth economy 
to low-growth economy, triggered by the oil crisis in 1973, financial 
structure of Japanese companies has changed to self financing and 
into returns structure. In other words, Japanese big businesses 
have taken their way to the direction that they would make a profit 
even with the low rate of output by lowering the break even point 
even in slow economic growth. 0 
In 1978, Japanese big businesses recovred to a state of de-
crease revenue but increase profit, though the level of their ordi-
nary profit had been very low since 1974. Furthermore, in 1979, they 
reached the state of increase revenue and increase profit, and made 
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a supreme profit. ln order to establish such corporate structure, 
Japanese big businesses cut their fixed cost drastically. They 
established self-financing system by repaying their debt, cutting 
back their expenditure for investment, and using internal finance 
for investment. In so doing, the ratio of interest paid was reduced 
from 5% in 1975 to 3% in 1978, and the ratio of depreciation was 
reduced greatly from 5% in 1971 to 3% in 1978, by virtue of curb-
ing investment and changing depreciation formula from the fixed 
rate method to the straight line method, moreover, by dismissing 
workers to a certain from 13.4% in 1975 to 12% in 1979. The main 
reason why Japanese big businesses were able to change their re-
turns structure during such a short period of time can be ex-
plained by "cheap management" which they had promoted since 
the late 1970's. 
For example, during between 1974 and 1978, 185 major compa-
nies out of 250 reduced their work force: That is to say, 3 compa-
nises out of 4 reduced their manpower. This personnel cut turned 
out to be 215, 000, over 1, 100 per a company in average, and it 
also deserves 12. 54% of 1, 715, 000, the total work force of 250 
major companies (according to a report of Industrial Labor Rese-
arch Institution). 
Such "cheap management" didn't contribute merely to reduction 
of labor force. First, it greatly increased the labor efficiency. 
On one hand major companies drastically curtailed labor force, on 
the other hand, they increased production and improved labor ef-
ficiency by closing or separating unprofitable sectors and concentra-
ting highly efficient and profitable sectors. 
7L According to a monthly report of the Ministry of Labor, while 
the quantity of output was increased by 8. 5% in 1979 compared 
with a year before, the number of employees in manufacturing 
companies went down by 2. 996 below the level of the year before. 
This means that labor efficiency was increased by 12. 1% at one 
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time, and in 1980 it showed a remarkable increase by 13. 8%. 
Second, by virtue of drastic cut of labor force, they started 
to get their production facilities automated. and computerised by 
promoting inventment for saving energy, rationalization, and saving 
labor. For example, conversion to oilless manufacturing method 
of iron and steel in the field of iron and steel industry or mass-
adoption of industrial robot in assemble lines in car industries have 
been promoted rapidly, and, as a result, Japanese big businesses 
realize "costdown effect" by lowering fuel unit cost and cutting 
down work force per output unit, therefore, they enhanced their 
earning power. 
Thus Japanese big businesses established 70% rate of output 
system (which means, they can make profit even though they use 
only 70% of production facilities), namely they have created a very 
stable industrial structure to produce large profit. 
5. The Major Company System and its Control 
System over Small Company 
It may not be sufficient to talk about the postwar, characteris-
tics of small companies only from the view point of their number 
them or their contribution to large part of production in Japan in 
spite of their relatively unstable management background. That is 
to say, it is these small companies that major companies have their 
base for existence. In other words, such subcontracting-subsidiary 
production structure of major companies based on these subcontrac-
tors of small buisiness has not only been the impetus for strength 
of Japanese companies in the world market, but also been the trigger 
of innovation. These small companies played a role of safty valve /\ 
during the period of industrial fluctuation and supported very high 
economic growth of Japan since the end of the war. 
That's why we have to pay attention to these companies. 
We usually find it very difficult to lear:n the details of Japa-
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nese enterprise in reality. 
It is because most of them have already formed several groups 
of enterprises as a sort of trust in the shape of pyramid. 
We can see these characteristics in such fields as shipbuild-
ing, car industry, electrical machinery, textiles, etc.. Let's take a 
car industry as a typical example of this phenomenon. 
Characteristics of a big car makers is the system of division 
of labour which makes car parts makers specialize in production 
process suitable for mass production, leaving the process unsuitable 
for mass production with subcontractors. In other words, the trust 
company which specializes in the final assembly line can "make 
the best use of mass production. "8 
What we have to notice at this point is, that in this system of 
division of labor for mass production, the smaller the size of car 
parts makers or subcontractors becomes, the more labor-intensive 
process they have to udertake. 
Originall it has been one of the characteristics of Japanese 
economy to have different level of wages according to the size of 
companies. For example, labor cost of small-sized subcontractors 
placed at the bottom of a pyramid is almost equal to 70% of labor 
cost in Korea. Therefore, a trust company on one hand produced 
high quality product at low cost by means of new technology and 
application of mass production technology, on the other hand, they 
made the most of small-sized subcontractors producing parts of cars 
through their labor-intensive process and using their low-wages. 
In this sense, the trust company at the summit of a pyramid 
realised duel cost cut combining these two factors. 
-1:; If we compare the ratio of internal production of Japanese trust 
3 Kikaishinkokyokai Keizaikenkyusho (Economic Reserch Institute of 
Machine Industry), KIKAIKANREN SHITAUKE KIGYO NO KOKUSAI KYO-
SORYOKU NI KANSURU KENKYU (Reserch on International Competitive 
Power of Machine Industry), 1980. 
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companies with that of the U.S.A., we can understand the fact more 
clearly. The ratio of internal production of Japanese trust company 
is only 25%, while that of the U.S.A. is 48%. These figures show 
that Japanese trust companies in car industry highly depend upon 
external transaction and subcontractors. 
Moreover, this system is described as a vertical control of a 
parent company over its subcontractors, in other words one-sided 
exploitation of a parent company over subcontractors, whereas the 
system of the U.S.A. is known as the horizontal divison of labor 
in which a car maker has to buy parts necessary for car production 
from other companies. 
The number of subsidiaries of TOYOT A, the biggest car maker 
in Japan, is 36, 400 in 1977. 
On the other hand, medium-and small-sized enterprises recently 
started to introduce newest equipment like NC manufacturing ma-
chines or micro-computers. 
According to June 1981, the report of the Ministry of Labor, 
93. 7% of companies holding upward 1, 000 labor force have already 
introduced MC or NC manufacturing machines and also 57. 1% of 
300 too 999 worker-sized companies and 40. 9% of 30 to 99 worker-
sized companies have already introduced them. 
However these figures show that they were compelled to in-
troduce such innovated machines in order to pass severe quality 
control of a parent company. 
This may be described as so-called "poverty by machines". 
The introduction of these automated machines round the clock 
is spreading night and day shifts among small eterprises, making 
working hours longer and longer, and forcing workers to work more /'-.. 
intensively. As mentioned before, it is obvious that the hierarchi-
cal production structure is also a structure of utilizing processing 
unit cost, based upon the difference of wages between large compa-
nies and small ones. Let's look up wage scale differences between 
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car makers and parts makers. If we take the wage of big compan-
ies holding more than 1, 000 workers, as 100 in 1977, then the 
wage of small companies holding only 2 to 3 workers deserves 19. 7. 
Furthermore, after the oil crisis of 1973, the difference of wages 
between large and small enterprises tend to get wider. Such low 
cost based on these low wages is the key to competitiveness of Japa-
nese companies in a world market. 
In small enterprises workers have to not only work at low 
wages but also work longer and overtime frequently. 
Generally speaking, their working places are more dangerou 
than those of workers in major enterprises, 40.8% of wokers in a 
company holding 30 to 99 labor force have to work more than 48 
hours a week, whereas 2.1% of workers in a company holding 
more than 1, 000 labor force have to work for the same hours. And 
51. 5% of workers in major companies have to work less than 40 
hours a week. Further, more according to the 1980 report of the 
Ministry of Labor, the number of workers who was dead or got 
injured in accidents (which means workers who had to be away 
from their jobs more than 4 days for their injury) was 337,600 
(3, 009 of them were dead). Comparing the statisitics with that of 
developed countries, it is notable that workers have more accidents 
in Japan than in any other developed country. what is worse, 80 
% of casualities is from medium and small-sized enterprises. Two 
reasons can be pointed out: That is, the request from major compa-
nies for reduction of unit cost and shortening of time for delivery. 
In addition to the inferior working conditions, labor in small enter-
prises are not well organized; Therefore a large number of workers 
E. are still unable to exercise their right. 
Workers in these medium and small-sized enterprises are an 
overwhelining majority of Japanese work force: In 1980, 803 million 
people worked in companies hoding less than 300 workers, occupying 
73. 5% of total work force. What is more, the percentage of workers 
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in medium and small-sized companies have been increasing since 
1975 when they occupied 70.7% of total work force. 
The very inferior working conditions of small companies serves 
as a warning to workers in major companies that once they lose 
their job all they can do is to fall down to small enterprises to find 
their job. 
On the other hand, it is true that workers in big businesses 
tend to have a sense of labor aristcrat, since they enjoying ralatively 
better working conditions compared with those of small companies. 4 
Because of this difference of working condition between major 
companies and medium and small-sized ones, workers in major 
companies are afraid of dismissal, bear irrational treatment, tend to 
be obedient to companies decision, although their working conditions 
are not necessarily better than those of the U.S.A. and of Europe. 
This difference also serves as the base of cooperation principle 
between labor and management the labor unions within each compa-
ny. 
This kind of difference is evident in "Japanese management" 
which is proud of its stable existence. 
6. Conclusion-Prospect of "Japanese Management" 
As it has been discussed, what is supporting "Japanese manage-
ment" is Japanese-style enterprise society. The "Japanese style 
enterprise society" consists of the cooperation system between the 
Government and the private enterprises as a pillar, and above it, 
building up a combination of tight control by top management of 
major enterprises, supported by enormous power of enterprise groups. 
It has been very firmly established through absolute control of 12:!! 
top management devived from nominal enterprise organizations and 
4 Iwao, Hirozumi, NIHONTEKI KEIEI NO IGI TO SONO KINO (Me-
anings and Functions of Japanese Management) in NIHONTEKI KEIEI RON 
(Japanese Management) TOKYO: Chuo University, 1982. 
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also through the support of leaders of labor union in a company 
who are cooperative to this control. 
Moreover, under the big business state, Japanese labor mana-
gement relations in enterprise feature collectivism and harmonious 
industrial relations, and are characterized by the life-time employ-
ment, seniority wages, and the coporate union. 
Besides, Japanese big businesses have established the hierachi-
cal production structure with the system which effectively utilizes 
the subcontractors of small businesses, and which assures the Ja-
panese big businesses of the international competitive power and 
the high accumulation of capital. 
As stated above, the "Jnpanese management" is the characteri-
stic of the structure of Japanese capitalism. This means that, we 
cannot expect that essentials of "Japanese managament" will collapse 
or change in the near future. It also depends on the inclination 
of Japanese working class. 
